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Surviving Strict Scrutiny: Upholding Federal
Affirmative Action After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
KATHRYN K LEEt
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfor-
tunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in re-
sponse to it."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 1995, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2 a
majority of the Supreme Court redefined the constitutional stan-
dard of review for federal affirmative action programs. 3 The
t J.D. candidate, May 1997, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
BA., 1994, University of Minnesota.
1. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
2. Id. at 2097.
3. The term "affirmative action" was first used by President Kennedy in 1961 in Ex-
ecutive Order No. 10925 which required federal contractors to take "affirmative action
to "promote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to
race." Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1961). Affirmative action was given an
expanded meaning in 1965 by President Johnson through Executive Order 11246. Exec.
Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
This mandate required that all government contracts include a provision which stated
that:
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin.
The difference between the two executive orders was that President Johnson's re-
quired employers to use race in its employment decisionmaking process. See Daniel A.
Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893 (1994); see
also Hugh Davis Graham, The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the Regu-
latory State, 523 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 50, 53-57 (1992).
For purposes of this Comment, the term affirmative action means all programs and
policies that employ racial classifications aimed at increasing minority participation and
representation in all aspects of American life-including education, employment, hous-
ing, and government contracting. While affirmative action additionally seeks to increase
participation by women as well, this Comment is limited to racial, and not gender, clas-
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Court's redetermination of the issue concludes a jurisprudential
debate that has lasted almost two decades.4 The decision reflects
the recent political debate over, and the backlash directed to-
wards, affirmative action programs. 5 These programs are de-
sifications. For a discussion of gender and equal protection analysis see George P.
Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected. The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, The Le-
gal Invisibility of its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J. 1069 (1995); Sandra L. Rier-
son, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case For Equal Treatment Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GEN. L. PoL' 89 (1994); Kevin A. Ashley, When
Worlds Collide: Peremptory Challenges, Gender, and Intermediate Scrutiny in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 46 FLA. L. REv. 261, 271-82 (1994); Holly Dyer, Gender-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion: Where Does it Fit in the Tiered Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 KAN. L.
REv. 591 (1993).
4. The Court first addressed the constitutionality of racial minority preferences in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Court
produced the first of several plurality opinions concerning affirmative action programs.
Id. In the following twelve years, the Court revisited the issue in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 US. 448 (1980), Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 US. 267 (1986), United
States v. Paradise, 480 US. 149 (1987), City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 US. 469
(1989), and Metro Broadcasting, Ina v. FCC, 497 US. 547 (1990). The various opinions
reflect the debate over the proper standard of constitutional review for affirmative action
programs that use race as a basis for decisionmaking. The dividing question was which
level of equal protection review should be applied to determine the constitutionality of
these programs. Essentially, in equal protection jurisprudence there are three levels of
judicial scrutiny - "rational basis" review, "intermediate scrutiny", and "strict scrutiny."
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITTONAL L.w 601-08 (12th ed. 1991). Each test involves a dif-
ferent amount of deference given to the law maker. Id. at 601. With respect to benign ra-
cial classifications, the debate has been whether "strict scrutiny" or "intermediate scru-
tiny" should be applied when determining the constitutionality of such programs. Strict
scrutiny requires that the programs be narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest. See, eg., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; Croson, 488 US. at 494. Intermediate
scrutiny requires that the programs only be substantially related to serve an important
governmental objective. See, eg., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565. While the debate may seem to be one of semantics,
the standards produce very different results. Programs that are subjected to intermedi-
ate scrutiny have a better chance of being upheld because the judicial inquiry into them
is not as probative. Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, can often mean the death of
whatever legislative action is being examined. See GUNTHER, supra, at 608-819; see also
infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. But see infra note 199.
5. This Comment does not seek to analyze the affirmative action debate. Much has
already been written on this issue. For a discussion of the debate see Gerald S. Janoff,
Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Supreme Court to Decide the Fate of
Affirmative Action, 69 TuL. L. REv. 997, 1009-16 (1995); John E. Morrison, Colorblind-
ness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79
IowA L. REv. 313 (1994); RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFF~iATwE
ACTION CONTROVERSY (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) [hereinafter RACIAL PREFERENCE]; JOHN C.
LmNGSTON, FAiR GAmE? INEQUALrIY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1979); John H. Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CHL L. REv. 723, 72741 (1974); Mar-
tin H. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. REv. 343 (1974).
In addition, many commentators are evaluating the economic, social, ethical, and
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signed to increase minority participation and representation in
employment, housing, education, and various nation-wide indus-
tries, such as federal contracting and communications.
In Adarand, the Supreme Court addressed the constitution-
ality of one such program. The Small Business Act 6 employs ra-
cial classifications aimed at increasing the participation of Mi-
nority Business Enterprises (MBEs) and Disadvantaged
Business Enterprises (DBEs).7 The Court determined that all af-
psychological effects of such programs. See, e-g., Russell J. Summers, Attitudes Toward
Different Methods of Affirmative Action, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PYSCHOL. 1090, 1090-1104
(1995) [hereinafter Summers, Attitudes]; Rupert W. Nacoste & Beth Hummels, Affirma-
tive Action and the Behavior of Decision Makers, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 595, 595-
613 (1994); David A. Kravitz & Judith Platania, Attitudes and Beliefs About Affirmative
Action: Effects of Target and of Respondent Sex and Ethnicity, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
928, 928-38 (1993); Madeline E. Heilman et al., Presumed Incompetent? Stigmatization
and Affirmative Action Efforts, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 536, 536-44 (1992); Larry W. Tay-
lor et al., Some New Historical Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action: Detroit,
1972, 21 Rav. BLACK PoL ECON. 81, 81-98 (1992); Shelly J. Lundberg, The Enforcement
of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alter-
natives, 106 Q. J. EcoN. 309, 309-26 (1991); Russell J. Summers, The Influence of Affirm-
ative Action on Perceptions of a Beneficiary's Qualifications, 21 J. APPLIED Soc. PYSCHOL.
1265, 1265-76 (1991)[hereinafter Summers, Influence); Michael Levin, Implications of
Race and Sex Differences for Compensatory Affirmative Action and the Concept of Dis-
crimination, 15 J. Soc. PoL ECON. STUD. 175, 175-212 (1990).
Since its inception, affirmative action has been a highly controversial issue. In re-
cent years, however, it has received considerable political attention. United States Sena-
tor Phil Gramm and California Governor Pete Wilson have led attacks on affirmative ac-
tion. Mary Lenz, Handling of Hot Issue Burns Sibley, Hous. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at A37.
In addition, anti-affirmative action initiatives have been introduced in both Houses of
Congress. See, eg., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1995, S. 26, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, S. 1085, H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(both of which would prohibit the federal government from utilizing any racial or gender
classifications in employment or contracting). Furthermore, in the November 1996 elec-
tion, citizens of California expressed their support at the ballot box for a proposed
amendment to the California Constitution, entitled the California Civil Rights Initiative
(Proposition 209). Dave Lesher, Battle Over Prop. 209 Moves to the Courts, LA TIMEs,
Nov. 7, 1996, at Al. Proposition 209 would prohibit all California state and local govern-
ments from "grant[ing] preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, pub-
lic education, or public contracting." Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in
California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 5, 1996. See Vilram D. Amar & Evan
H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996); Erwin Chereminsky, The Impact of the Proposed California
Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 999 (1996); Neil Gotanda, Failure of the
Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996) for an analysis of the California Civil Rights Initiative
and its possible effects.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656 (1994).
7. For a detailed analysis of the Small Business Act see infra notes 92-97 and ac-
companying text. See also Major Thomas J. Hasty, III, Minority Business Enterprise De-
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firmative action programs, including the Small Business Act,
must be reviewed under strict scrutiny analysis. 8 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that such programs,
whether enacted by a municipality, state, or Congress, must be
"narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmen-
tal interests."9
The application of the strict scrutiny standard to affirmative
action programs seems to strike fear in the hearts of those who
fully support such programs. Since the Adarand decision, com-
mentators have predicted an end to affirmative action programs
which utilize racial classifications designed to benefit minori-
ties.'0 The label "strict scrutiny" has been characterized as
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact."" Quite simply, this means
that most legislative action subjected to this highest standard of
review is usually struck down. However, such a panic reaction
to the Court's decision in Adarand ignores the possibility of up-
holding affirmative action programs using the language of the
Majority and the cases upon which it relies to derive at its con-
clusion. 2 In fact, strict scrutiny of Congressional race-based re-
lief will not be "fatal in fact" because of the long established rec-
ognition that Congress should be afforded more deference than
state and local governments in enacting such programs.
13
This note will focus on the decision in Adarand and discuss
the strict scrutiny standard the Court applied to federal affirma-
tive action programs. 4 Part I will briefly examine the history of
velopment and the Small Business Administration's 8(A) Program: Past, Present, and (Is
There a) Future?, 145 ML.. L. REv. 1 (1994).
8. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
9. Id.
10. See Eminski Davis, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Turning Back the Clock
on Minority Set-Asides, 23 S.U. L. REv. 79, 91 (1995) ("[T]he Adarand decision both
heightened the level of equal protection scrutiny afforded to federal affirmative action
programs and placed a legal damper on the future of minority set-asides"); Kenneth A.
Martin et al., Is This the End of Federal Minority Contracting?, 42 FED. LAw. 44, 48
(1995) ("Federal Minority contracting preference programs stand on the brink of extinc-
tion."). See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('[Strict scru-
tiny] has usually been understood to spell the death of any governmental action to
which a court may apply it.").
11. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part HI.
14. The purpose of this Comment is not to criticize or applaud the Adarand deci-
sion. This Comment instead attempts to analyze the decision as it has been written and
discuss the ways in which it can be used to uphold federal affirmative action programs
in light of the strict scrutiny standard. For a discussion of how contemporary social sci-
ence studies, which investigate the nature and psychology of racial biases, can be used
to justify and design affirmative action programs, see Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to
932 [Vol. 44
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the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis of race-conscious
programs' 15 Part II will analyze the Adarand decision, and in-
clude a discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions.'
6
Part III will conclude the discussion by arguing that the strict
scrutiny standard, as applied by the Court at the federal level,
does not mean the death of affirmative action measures enacted
by Congress. 7
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
SUPREME COURT
The Adarand case does not present an issue of first impres-
sion for the Supreme Court. Since 1978, the Court has heard
several cases concerning the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion programs.S The cases were brought by non-minorities who
claimed that race-conscious remedies violated their equal protec-
tion rights afforded by the Fifth 9 and Fourteenth" Amendments
be Carefully Taught": Justifying Affirmative Action After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1141 (1996). For an applause of the Adarand decision see Brian C. Eades, The
United States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29
CREI HT'ON L. REv. 771, 779-809 (1996) (concluding that the decision recognizes correctly
that affirmative action and equal protection are inconsistent); Stephen C. Minnich, Com-
ment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 46
CASE W. RES. L REv. 279 (1995) (stating that Adarand refreshingly consolidates equal
protection jurisprudence concerning racial classifications). For a criticism of the Court's
holding see Davis, supra note 10 (arguing that the Court should have adhered to prece-
dent and not overruled Metro Broadcasting); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading
Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 151 (1995) (concluding that the Court in Adarand "im-
posed an artificial symmetry on equal protection jurisprudence by using... abstract
concepts..., while it disregarded the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the historical
relationship between race and federalism, and current social and political realities.")
[hereinafter Leading Cases]; see also Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of
Consistency: Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 101 DicK L. Ray. _ (1997).
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part M.
18. See, eg., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265 (1978); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 US. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); City
of Richmond v. JAL Croson Co., 488 US. 469 (1989); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 US. 547 (1990).
19. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides in relevant part that: "No
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... !
U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977), for a discussion of the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment.
20. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states that: "IN]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
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of the United States Constitution. 21 The various decisions pro-
duced by the Court in this arena reflect the difficulty in deter-
mining the constitutional validity of affirmative action programs
that utilize racial classifications.
22
The jurisprudential debate has revolved around determining
the proper standard of review for such programs. While the
Court has agreed that some heightened level of review was re-
quired, it could not decide whether intermediate or strict scru-
tiny applied.2 In order to understand the background and impli-
cations of the Adarand decision, it is necessary to understand
the Court's past decisions and prior case law concerning the con-
stitutionality of invidious and benign racial classifications.
A. Invidious Classifications and Equal Protection Under the
Fifth Amendment
In 1943, the Supreme Court addressed a Fifth Amendment
equal protection challenge to a governmental racial classification
for the first time. In Hirabayashi v. United States,24 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a curfew applicable only to
those citizens of Japanese ancestry.25 In upholding the curfew,
the Court found that the Fifth Amendment "contain[ed] no
equal protection clause and it restrain[ed] only such discrimina-
tory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due
process."
26
Similarly, in Korematsu v. United States,27 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a wartime measure
which completely excluded persons of Japanese ancestry from
particular geographical areas. The decision noted that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect,"28 and courts must subject such restric-
amend. XIV, § 1.
21. For purposes of this Comment, "non-minorities" refers to those individuals who
did not qualify under affirmative action programs intended to benefit racial minorities
and women. Usually this means white males-the petitioners in Adarand, Metro Broad.
casting, Croson, Wygant, Paradise, Fullilove, and Bakke were all white males or compa-
nies owned and controlled by white males.
22. See supra text accompanying note 4.
23. For a definition of intermediate and strict scrutiny standards see discussion
supra note 4.
24. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
25. Id. at 83.
26. Id. at 100 (citing Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1943)).
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. Id. at 216.
934 [Vol. 44
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tions to rigorous analysis. 29 However, the Court went on to hold
that the exclusionary provision was within the federal govern-
ment's power given the perceived wartime threat.30
By 1954, the Court began to question whether any differ-
ence existed between Congressional and state power to adopt
discriminatory race-based measures. In Bolling v. Sharpe,31 the
Court considered a Fifth Amendment challenge to the District of
Columbia's school desegregation policies.3 2 The Court noted that
"'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than 'due process of the law.... . "33 How-
ever, relying on its decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
34
the Court found that since states were prohibited from operat-
ing segregated schools, the Constitution required that the same
hold true for the Federal Government.
35
From 1975 to 1987, the Court's decisions continued to indi-
cate a trend towards similar analyses of equal protection claims
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme
Court was ensuring that states and the federal government be
similarly restricted from violating the equal protection rights of
minorities. This is evidenced by the fact that most of the cases
involved challenges to racial classifications which burdened mi-
norities.36 Thus, the Court required that minorities be protected
from invidious discrimination by any governmental actor-
whether it be federal, state or local. However, it wasn't until
29. Id.
30. Id. at 218-19. The decision in Korematsu, and the race-based exclusionary provi-
sion it upheld, have been highly criticized by many commentators for their obvious in-
vidious discriminatory effects. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); PER I- IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). The
decision was vacated in 1984 in Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984), but it continues to be cited for its propositions concerning the strict scrutiny stan-
dard and Congress' power during wartime. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 639 n.5.
31. 347 US. 497 (1954).
32. Id. at 498.
33. Id. at 499.
34. 347 US. 483 (1954).
35. Bolling, 347 US. at 500. The Court stated that because "the Constitution pro-
hibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be un-
thinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern-
ment." Id.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 US. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
plurality) ("the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coex-
tensive with that of the Fourteenth"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal pro-
tection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 US. 636, 638 r2 (1975) (This Court's ap-
proach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same
as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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1978 that the Court addressed the issue of whether race-based
remedial measures, intended to benefit minorities, should be
held to the same standard of review.
B. The Court's Inability to Adopt a Standard of Review for
Affirmative Action
From 1978 to 1989, the Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of race-conscious programs designed to benefit minorities. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke37 the Court ex-
amined whether a state-run medical school's admission policy of
reserving a specific number of seats for minorities violated the
equal protection rights of non-minorities. 38 In Bakke, a white
medical school applicant challenged the admissions policy after
he was twice denied admission to the school, even though his
qualifications outranked many of those admitted in the respec-
tive minority seats. 39 Although the Court did not produce a ma-
jority opinion concerning the proper standard of constitutional
review, it did find that the admissions plan could not be up-
held.40 Justice Powell, in his plurality opinion, stated that "the
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when ap-
plied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color."41 A majority of the justices, including
Powell, did find that diversity of a student body in higher educa-
tion was a constitutionally permissible purpose.42 The Majority,
however, could not agree on a proper standard of review. 3
37. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 276-77.
40. Id. at 319-20. For a discussion of the Bakke decision, see Adolphus Levi Wl-
liams, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the Bakke Case, 16 S.U. L. REv. 129 (1989); see also
Stanley Mosk, For Bakke, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra note 5, at 161, 161-66 (arguing
that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for the admissions program);
Richard B. Sobol, Against Bakke, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra note 5, at 169, 169-74
(stating that the lower courts characterization of affirmative action programs as "inher-
ently suspect" was inappropriate considering their benign purposes); Ronald Dworkin,
Are Quotas Unfair?, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra note 5, at 177, 177-90 (defending the
special admissions plan at issue in Bakke).
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
42. Id. at 312. "The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to educa-
tion includes the selection of its student body .... The atmosphere of 'speculation, ex-
periment, and creation' - so essential to the quality of higher education - is widely be-
lieved to be promoted by a diverse student body." Id. at 326 (Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting).
43. Four Justices agreed on an intermediate standard of review (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part),
while four others thought the case should be decided on statutory grounds (Stevens, J.,
936 [Vol. 44
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Two years later the Court addressed the constitutionality of
a minority set-aside program in Fullilove v. Klutznick.4 The
Court examined the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,45
which provided for the distribution of federal funds to state and
local governments for public works projects.4 The statute re-
quired that such grants only be distributed if there were assur-
ances that at least 10 percent of the dollar value of the contract
would be subcontracted to certified MBEs.47 Once again, as in
Bakke, there was no majority opinion for the Court.
Then Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and
Powell, found that the program would satisfy either strict or in-
termediate scrutiny.4 Stressing Congress' broad remedial pow-
ers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 49 Chief
Justice Burger found that Congress was empowered to identify
and remedy past discrimination through MBE set-aside pro-
grams.50 However, the Court stated that "[amny preference based
on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict
with constitutional guarantees." 51 Moreover, in upholding the
program, the Court found that it was strictly remedial in na-
ture, imposed a relatively light burden on non-minorities, and
included a waiver provision when no MBEs were available.
52
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, and Rehnquist J.J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
44. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
45. 42 US.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1994).
46. Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 453. For an in-depth analysis of the facts and implications
of Fullilove, see Drew S. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987); John E. Richards,
Equal Protection and Racial Quotas: Where Does Fullilove v. Klutznick Leave Us?, 33
BAYLOR L REv. 601 (1981).
47. Fullilove, 448 US. at 454 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988)).
48. Id. at 492.
49. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment states "Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
50. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472-73. Chief Justice Burger stated:
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context,
calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appro-
priate deference to Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution
with the power to "provide for the .. .general Welfare of the United States"
and "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 472. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1 and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.).
51. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491.
52. Id. at 487-88. Thus, the Court determined that, because of these qualities, the
program withstood the "sufficiently" or "narrowly tailored7 leg of either the intermediate
or strict scrutiny standard. Id
937Fall 1996]
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The Fullilove Court directly upheld Congress' power to use
race-conscious remedial measures to eradicate the effects of ra-
cial discrimination and to prevent the recurrence of that dis-
crimination.53 However, it could not decide on an appropriate
standard of review. 4 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, re-
affirmed that all racial classifications should be held to the
strict scrutiny standard, thus reiterating his position taken in
Bakke.55 Applying the standard in a more lenient fashion, he ex-
plained that the test's compelling interest leg could be satisfied
if the appropriate governmental authority found instances of il-
legal discrimination. 56 Supporting this position, Justice Powell
stated that "[g]overnment does have a legitimate interest in
ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination."
5 7
Furthermore, he asserted that these findings could be gathered
from previous enactments of legislation and by an examination
of "the total contemporary record of congressional action dealing
with the problems of racial discrimination against minority busi-
ness enterprises."58
In 1986, the Court was provided with another opportunity
to decide the appropriate standard of review for determining the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs. In Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,59 the Court was called on to deter-
mine the constitutional validity of a race-based lay-off provision,
which gave preferential treatment to minorities. 60 Once again, it
could not reach a consensus on the applicable standard of
review.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell concluded that in
order for the race based program to pass constitutional muster,
53. Id. at 490.
54. Id. at 517-22. Justices Marshall's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, stated that intermediate scrutiny should be the appropriate standard of
review for affirmative action programs. Id.
55. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 498-99, 502. "[Tlhe National Legislature is competent to find constitu-
tional and statutory violations. [It] properly may - and indeed must . address directly
the problems of discrimination in our society." Id. at 499.
57. Id. at 497.
58. Id. at 503.
59. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
60. For an in-depth analysis of the facts, holdings, and effect of Wygant, see Richard
J. Cairns, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.-A Question of Layoffs, 8 PAcE L. Rav. 159
(1988); Joanne C. Ferriot, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education: Some More Equally
Protected Than Others, 32 Loy. L. RFv. 1045 (1987); Deborah E. Klein, Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education: Affirmative Action and the Innocent Party, 18 U. ToL. L. REv.
519 (1987); Maureen T. Shine, Reverse Discrimination: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
cation, Affirmative Action Versus Seniority Rights, 55 UMKC L. REv. 698 (1987).
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it would have to withstand strict, and not intermediate scrutiny,
analysis. 61 Accordingly, the proper two part inquiry was
"whether the layoff provision [wals supported by a compelling
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that
purpose [was] narrowly tailored." 2 Furthermore, the plurality
asserted that adequate evidence of past discrimination needed
to be offered to justify any program's adoption.63 Moreover, the
Court determined that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more,
is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified rem-
edy."64 Even though Wygant did not produce a majority opinion,
it marked the beginning of the Court's adoption of strict scru-
tiny analysis of affirmative action programs.
65
C. The Court Finally Produces Majority Opinions Concerning
Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court had yet to produce a majority opinion
outlining the appropriate constitutional standard of review for
affirmative action programs. Finally, in 1989, the Court in City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,66 explicitly stated that the strict
scrutiny standard applied to state and local affirmative action
programs.67 The Court reviewed a Virginia MBE utilization ordi-
nance which required all non-minority owned prime contractors
who were awarded city contracts to subcontract a minimum of
30 percent of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more
MBEs. 68 The Court's Majority concluded that Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to state and local set-aside programs
need to be analyzed using the highest judicial scrutiny. Reaf-
61. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
62. Id. at 274.
63. Id. at 277. The Court stated that a "public employer . . .must ensure that,
before it embarks on an affirmative-action program... it must have sufficient evidence
to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." Id.
64. Id. at 276.
65. It should be noted that at issue in Wygant was a local school board's collective
bargaining agreement, which included a remedial racial classification. Thus, the Court
was beginning to adopt strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of constitutional re-
view for state and local affirmative action, and not Congressionally mandated programs.
In essence, Wygant laid the groundwork for the Court's decision in Croson. See infra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
67. Id. at 494. For a thorough analysis of the facts and implications of the Croson
decision, see Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Applica-
tion of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. Huu. RTs. L. RFv. 679 (1995); David P. Stoelting, Note,
58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1097 (1990); Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action
and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. RFv. 1729 (1989).
68. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
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finming its plurality decision in Wygant, the Court stated that
the "purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant the use of a highly suspect tool."69
Furthermore, the Court concluded that Richmond's set-aside did
not meet either prong of the strict scrutiny standard, and
thereby invalidated the set-aside law as unconstitutional.
70
Croson marked the first time a majority of the Court de-
cided strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for
state and local affirmative action programs. 71 The Court ex-
pressly limited its decision to Fourteenth Amendment challenges
to state race-conscious remedial actions. 72 The Court in Croson
distinguished Fullilove on the basis that Congressional power
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
held by state or local governments. 73 Thus, states were not af-
forded the same discretion as Congress to redress the effects of
societal discrimination.74
In 1990, the Court again addressed the constitutionality of
a federal MBE set-aside when it reviewed two policies adopted
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.75 In
determining whether the race-conscious provisions violated the
Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, the Court drew
a distinction between "benign" and "invidious" racial classifica-
tions. The five judge majority76 then held that benign race-
69. Id. at 493.
70. Id. at 494.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 489-91. The majority in Croson engaged in a lengthy discussion about
Congressional power to enact appropriate remedies to combat discrimination. Because
the authority came from Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and local gov-
ernments could not be afforded the same power. Id. at 490-93.
73. Id. at 490-91 ("Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Thus,
our treatment of an exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be dispositive
here").
74. Id.
75. 497 US. 547 (1990). Several commentators have analyzed the facts, opinions,
and effects of the Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting. See, eg., Sally Morris, One
More Battle in the Ongoing War Over Affirmative Action: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 26 NEW ENG. L. Rav. 921 (1992); Samuel L. Starks, Understanding Government Af-
firmative Action and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 41 DuKE L.J. 933 (1992); Michael
B. Bressman, Recent Development, 14 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL' 259 (1991); Michel Rosen-
feld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitu-
tional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583 (1991).
76. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens constituted the ma-
jority. Metro Broadcasting, 497 US. at 550.
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conscious measures should be analyzed by an intermediate level
of scrutiny, even if they were not remedial in nature.77 The Ma-
jority found that deference was due to Congress to enact such
measures, based on its consideration of appropriate factual find-
ings and available alternatives.78 Justice Stevens filed a concur-
ring opinion where he restated the proposition that race con-
scious classifications are only appropriate if "clearly identified
and unquestionably legitimate."
7 9
Four Justices dissented,80 claiming that the Court should
use "a most searching examination" to determine the constitu-
tionality of the programs and thus apply strict, not intermedi-
ate, scrutiny.8' The dissent distinguished Fullilove, which in-
volved Congressional power, by noting that the case at bar
involved a federal agency, and therefore did not implicate Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 Additionally, the dis-
sent stated that even under intermediate scrutiny, the FCC pro-
gram at issue would not withstand such analysis because less
intrusive race-neutral alternatives were available.83
Most recently, on June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court was
called upon again to consider the appropriate standard of review
for federal affirmative action programs in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena. The Court's purview of case history regarding af-
firmative action stretched across a spectrum of standards of re-
view.84 As the law stood before Adarand was decided, state and
local affirmative action programs needed to be strictly scruti-
nized to determine if such programs were narrowly tailored to
achieve a significant governmental interest.8 5 Federal programs,
on the other hand, only had to survive intermediate scrutiny,
which required that affirmative action programs serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and were substantially related to
77. Id. at 564-65.
78. Id. at 569-83. "[We must pay close attention to the expertise of the Commission
and the factfinding of Congress when analyzing the nexus between minority ownership
and programming diversity. With respect to this complex empirical question, we are re-
quired to give great weight to the decisions of Congress." (internal quotations omitted).
Id- at 569.
79. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534-35 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)).
80. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia dissented. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 605-06.
83. Id. at 622, 630. Thus, the dissent claimed the FCC program was not substan-
tially related to the stated interest, and failed the second prong of the intermediate scru-
tiny standard. Id
84. See supra notes 37-79 and accompanying text.
85. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 493 (1989).
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achievement of that objective.86 The difference was grounded in
the fact that Congress, unlike state and local governments, had
the express authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy past discrimination.
87
The Adarand decision, however, has significantly altered
the constitutional standard of review.8 The Court could have de-
termined that Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting provided the
precedential authority requiring that all federal affirmative ac-
tion programs, including the Small Business Act, be held to an
intermediate level of scrutiny.89 Fullilove and Metro Broadcast-
ing were, after all, the leading cases which addressed Congres-
sional authority to enact race-conscious remedial programs.
However, the Court in Adarand held that federal affirmative ac-
tion programs needed to be strictly scrutinized, 90 and therefore
it overruled Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting to the extent both
cases held otherwise.9 1
II. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA
A. Factual Predicate and Statutory Scheme
In Adarand the Supreme Court was called on to investigate
and determine the constitutionality of the Small Business Act.92
In the last twenty-five years, the Act has significantly expanded
its focus to address the concerns of small businesses owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individu-
als.93 Section 502 of the Act provides the statutory mandate for
federal agencies to establish utilization goals for DBEs in fed-
eral procurement contracting.94
86. Metro Broadcasting, 497 US. at 565.
87. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
88. See infra Part Il.B.
89. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2113.
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656 (1994). In 1958, Congress enacted the Act to address the
concerns of small businesses. The Act created the Small Business Administration to im-
plement the statutory directives. Id. § 633.
93. In 1971, President Nixon directed federal agencies, in conjunction with the SBA,
to include minority business enterprises in small business contracting opportunities. See
Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3 C.F.R. 616 (1971-1975).
94. 15 US.C. § 644 (1994). Section 502 requires all federal agencies to establish spe-
cific annual goals for small disadvantaged business participation in federal procurement
contracts. Id. § 644(g)(2). This goal has been established at 5 percent of the total value
of all contracts awarded. Id. § 644(g)(1).
Section 502 of the Small Business Act provides that:
(1) The President shall annually establish Government-wide goals for pro-
942 [Vol. 44
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The primary way by which agencies meet these participa-
tion goals is through the SBA's 8(a) disadvantaged business pro-
gram.9 5 This program confers a variety of benefits on partici-
pants, one of which includes automatic eligibility for
subcontractor compensation clauses (SCC). These clauses appear
in most federal contracts. Under an SCC, prime contractors who
award at least 10 percent of the dollar amount of a contract to
DBEs 96 receive financial benefits.
97
curement contracts awarded, to small business concerns [and] small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged in-
dividuals.... The Government-wide goal for participation by small business
concerns shall be established at not less than 20 percent of the total value of
all prime contract awards for each fiscal year. The Government-wide goal for
participation by small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals shall be established at not less than 5
percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each
fiscal year ... Notwithstanding the Government-wide goal, each agency shall
have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the maximum practicable
opportunity for small business concerns [and] small business concerns owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals... to
participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency. The Administra-
tion and the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy shall,
when exercising their authority pursuant to paragraph (2), insure that the cu-
*mulative annual prime contract goals for all agencies meet or exceed the an-
nual Government-wide prime contract goal established by the President pursu-
ant to this paragraph.
(2) The head of each Federal agency shall, after consultation with the Ad-
ministration, establish goals for the participation by small business concerns
[and] by small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged individuals... in procurement contracts of such agency.
Goals established under this subsection shall be jointly established by the Ad-
ministration and the head of each Federal agency and shall realistically reflect
the potential of small business concerns [and] small business concerns owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals ... to
perform such contracts and to perform subcontracts under such contracts ....
Id. § 644(g)(1)-(2).
95. The Small Business Act's 8(a) program, and its history, are extensively detailed
and discussed in Hasty, supra note 7.
96. In order to participate in the SBA program, a DBE must be annually certified
as socially and economically disadvantaged. The Act defines "socially disadvantaged indi-
v.iduals" as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias
because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qual-
ities", 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1994), and it defines "economically disadvantaged individu-
als" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free en-
terprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same business who are not socially disadvantaged." Id.
§ 637(a)(6)(A). In addition, the business must be at least 51 percent owned and con-
trolled by such an individual to qualify for the program. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103 (1996). The
SBA presumes that African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent Asian Americans are socially disadvantaged for
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The Central Federal Lands Highway Division (CFLHD), a
regional office of the Federal Lands Highway Division, utilizes a
SCC in its contracts. In 1989, Mountain Gravel & Construction
Company, a prime contractor, was awarded a federal contract
for the construction of a highway in the state of Colorado by the
CFLHD.98 It then began accepting bids for the guardrail portion
of the contract. Among the bidders were two subcontractors -
Adarand Constructors, a Colorado guardrail company owned
and controlled by a white male, and Gonzales Construction
Company, a certified DBEY9 Although Adarand underbid Gonza-
les by 800 dollars, Gonzales was awarded the contract. 100 By do-
ing so, Mountain Gravel received a financial bonus of $10,000
under the SCC.'0'
Adarand filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado claiming, inter alia, that the Small Business Act vio-
lated Adarand's right to equal protection guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 10 2 The District Court
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment.10 3 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 04 It relied
on Fullilove,1°5 Croson,0 6 and Metro Broadcasting,107 and deter-
mined that intermediate scrutiny applied to challenges against
federal afirmative action programs. 108 In upholding the District
Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit held that the portion of the
purposes of the program. Id. § 124.105(b). This presumption is rebuttable if a third
party comes forward with "clear and convincing evidence" showing that the participant
is neither socially nor economically disadvantaged. Id. § 124.111(c)-(d), 124.601-124.609.
In addition, non-minority owned small businesses can qualify as DBEs if they otherwise
meet the requirements of an economically disadvantaged individual. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)
(1994).
97. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, if
a prime contractor awards subcontracts to one DBE, he or she is eligible to receive up to
1.5 percent of the value of the original contract as a bonus. Additionally, if a contractor
awards subcontracts to two or more DBEs, he or she is eligible to receive up to 2 percent
of the value of the original contract. Id.
98. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1542.
102. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992), affid
sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
103. Id. at 245.
104. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.
105. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
106. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
107. 497 US. 547 (1990).
108. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1537.
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Small Business Act in question would withstand such analy-
sis.10 9 Adarand appealed this decision.110 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari"' to reexamine the appropriate standard of
review for federal affirmative action programs.
In Adarand Constructors, Ina v. Pena,"1 the Supreme Court
found that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of
review when it analyzed the program. It then held that all af-
firmative action programs, including the Small Business Act,
needed to be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard. 13 Be-
cause neither lower court used this standard, the Supreme
Court remanded the case, with instructions to analyze the pro-
gram using strict scrutiny analysis."'
B. Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that
the strict scrutiny-standard applied to all governmental racial
classifications." 5 She began the Court's equal protection analysis
by examining the history of the Court's interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment and the rights it protects. By analyzing cases
such as Hirabayashi1 6 and Korematsu,"7 Justice O'Connor illus-
trated how deference to Congressional power can lead to the
"most unfortunate results."" 8 Subsequently, she cited a variety
of cases which stood for the proposition that no distinction ex-
isted between equal protection analysis under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments." 9
Having established this principle, Justice O'Connor dis-
109. Id.
110. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104.
111. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
112. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
113. Id. at 2113.
114. Id. at 2118. For a discussion of the possible outcome of Adarand on remand,
see Jerome R. Watson & Akinyale Harrison, Government Contracting: Affirmative Action
After Adarand, 74 MICH. Bus. L.J. 1162 (1995) (stating that on remand, the government's
Small Business Act will withstand strict scrutiny.). See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2128-
30 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2113 ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.").
116. 320 US. 81 (1943).
117. 323 US. 214 (1944). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
118. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2016.
119. Id. at 2107-08 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 US. 149 (1987); McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 US. 184 (1964); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 US. 636 (1975); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 US. 497 (1954)). See supra note 36.
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cussed the Court's recent decisions on affirmative action.20 She
pulled from both majority and dissenting opinions various Jus-
tices' conclusions that strict scrutiny should apply.121 Relying
heavily on Wygant and Croson, two cases involving state and
not federal actors, she delineated the legal reasoning and policy
considerations behind the use of the standard. 122 From these
cases, the Court concluded that three general propositions in re-
gard to governmental racial classification had emerged from the
Court: skepticism, consistency, and congruence.2 3
Skepticism was evidenced by the Court's history of labeling
racial classifications as "inherently suspect"124 and "odious to a
free people."25 Consistency required that equal protection analy-
sis "not depend[] on the race of those burdened or benefitted by
a particular classification."2 Finally, congruence in the applica-
tion of equal protection between the federal and state govern-
ments was necessary to ensure that "any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification ...
under the strictest judicial scrutiny."27
Justice O'Connor then turned to Metro Broadcasting and ex-
plained how its holding "turned its back on Croson"'28 and
"squarely rejected"' 29 the three precedential propositions. 130
Moreover, Justice O'Connor stated that by holding benign fed-
eral racial classifications to an intermediate level of scrutiny,
the decision in Metro Broadcasting was "a significant departure
from much of what had come before it."' 13 In addition, the fact
that the Court in Metro Broadcasting did not outline any test to
determine what was in fact a benign racial classification further
undermined its authority.
132
120. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-11.
121. Id. at 2109-12.
122. Id. Justice O'Connor relied heavily on Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wy-
gant to demonstrate why the Court was adopting strict scrutiny. For instance, she stated
that 'the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification
operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimi-
nation Id. at 2109 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (Powell, J., plurality)).
123. Id. at 2111-12.
124. Id. at 2111 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
125. Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, ,320 US. 81, 100 (1943)).
126. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)).
127. Id. at 2111.
128. Id. at 2112.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2112.
132. Id. The Court in Metro Broadcasting stated that "an examination of the legisla-
tive scheme and its history... will separate benign measures from other types of racial
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Subsequently, the Court's opinion departed into a discussion
of stare decisis, and an analysis of when adherence to it is not
necessary. The Court stated that when adhering to precedent
"involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its
scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience," the
Court is not required to follow it. 1 3 Justice O'Connor then con-
cluded that Metro Broadcasting did collide with prior doctrine.
34
Thus, Metro Broadcasting was overruled as an aberration in
equal protection jurisprudence.'
135
The majority concluded by dismissing the notion that it was
implicitly holding all affirmative action measures employing ra-
cial or ethnic classifications unconstitutional. 136 Rejecting the
criticism that strict scrutiny was "'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,'-137 Justice O'Connor declared that "[t]he unhappy persis-
tence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial dis-
crimination against minority groups in this country is an unfor-
tunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it." 138 In addition, the Court explicitly stated that to
the extent that programs are based on disadvantage, as opposed
to race, they are subjected only to "the most relaxed judicial
scrutiny."
139
The Court did not decide whether the SCC contractual pro-
vision violated the strict scrutiny standard, but instead re-
manded the case back to the Tenth Circuit for that determina-
tion.140 It provided the Court of Appeals some guidance in
making the determination, by explaining that it should look to
whether there were any considerations of race-neutral alterna-
tives, and whether the provision was "appropriately limited" in
classification." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12 (1990) (internal
quotations omitted).
133. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2115 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106
(1940)).
134. Id. at 2117 ("Metro Broadcasting's untenable distinction between state and fed-
eral racial classifications lacks support in our precedent, and undermines the fundamen-
tal principle of equal protection as a personal right.").
135. Id. at 2113.
136. Id. at 2118.
137. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2105.
140. Id. at 2118 ("he question whether any of the ways in which the Government
uses subcontractor compensation clauses can survive strict scrutiny, and any relevant
distinctions such as these may have to that question, should be addressed in the first in-





Justices Scalia and Thomas both filed separate opinions
whereby they concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment.14 Both Justices would have taken a more severe stance
with respect to the constitutionality of affirmative action mea-
sures using race as a basis for decisionmaking.'4
Justice Scalia, following his previous opinions on affirmative
action, stated that the "government can never have a compelling
interest in discriminating on the basis of race to make-up for
past racial discrimination." Although he agreed with the ma-
jority that strict scrutiny was the only proper standard of review
for affirmative action programs, he disagreed with O'Connor's
assertion that government can have an interest in adopting
race-conscious remedial relief in certain circumstances.145 He
stated that "under our Constitution there can be no such thing
as either a creditor or a debtor race." 46 Thus, Scalia would have
virtually eliminated any future use of affirmative action mea-
sures by any governmental agency.
Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny was the proper test
to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams.147 He wrote separately to express his view that "there is
[no] racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal pro-
tection .... [and that such paternalism] can be as poisonous
and pernicious as any other form of discrimination."14 He con-
cluded that affirmative action programs, even if adopted with
the best of intentions, "stamp minorities with a badge of inferi-
ority and may cause them to develop dependence or to adopt an
141. Id. Interestingly enough, the Court did not give guidance to the lower court in
applying what will prove to be the more difficult part-whether the programs are sup-
ported by sufficient evidence to justify a compelling state interest. See infra Part III.B.
142. Id. at 2118-19.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Jus-
tice Scalia relied on his concurrence in Croson where he first stated the position that
"those who believe that racial preferences can help to 'even the score' display, and rein-
force, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and that will, if
it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still." Croson, 488 U.S. 469,
527-28.
145. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
146. Id. at 2118.




attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences."149 As such, he
too would have virtually held all remedial race-conscious pro-
grams unconstitutional.
D. Dissenting Opinions
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg each wrote separate dis-
senting opinions with differing views and analyses. However,
most dissenters agreed that there was indeed a constitutional
distinction between racial and ethnic classifications designed to
aid minorities and those that discriminate against them.150 Jus-
tice Stevens filed a lengthy dissent in which he criticized the
majority's use of "consistency" and "congruence" to reach a deci-
sion which "deliver[ed] a disconcerting lecture about the evils of
governmental racial classifications" 15 ' While he "welcome[d]" the
Court's idea of skepticism with respect to all racial classifica-
tions, 52 he disagreed with the majority's analysis and applica-
tion (or inapplication) of stare decisis.
153
Justice Stevens first questioned the majority's inability to
distinguish between benign and invidious forms of discrimina-
tion.154 He noted that the Court's use of "consistency" would
treat a law which forbid African-Americans from serving in the
military the same as a law that was designed to recruit African-
American soldiers.155 As such, Justice Stevens found that the
149. Id. The assertions made by Justice Thomas concerning the effects of affirma-
tive action are the subject of sociological and psychological debate. For an analysis of
these propositions, see, for example, Summers, Attitudes, supra note 5; Heilman, supra
note 5; Summers, Influence, supra note 5.
150. For instance, Justice Stevens stated that "[t]here is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that
seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Stevens quoted his Fullilove opinion, where he first stated that "ra-
cial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment. .. " Id.
(quoting Fullilove, 448 US. at 533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
153. Id. at 2126-28. Justice Stevens stated that "t]he Court's concept of stare decisis
treats some of the language we have used in explaining our decisions as though it were
more important than our actual holdings. In my opinion that treatment is incorrect?' Id
at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2121-22. He asserted that there is a distinct "difference between a 'No
Trespassing' sign and a 'welcome mat." Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. Justice Stevens also suggested that the Majority would treat a "Dixiecrat
Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep Af-
rican Americans off the Supreme Court as on par with President Johnson's evaluation
of his nominee's race as a positive factor' Id.
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Majority's desire for consistent application of legal doctrine
"does not justify treating differences as though they were
similarities."
156
Justice Stevens also criticized the Court's concept of "con-
gruence," stating that "[it] assumes that there is no significant
difference between a decision by the Congress of the United
States to adopt an affirmative action program and such a deci-
sion by a State or a municipality."157 He quoted several passages
of previous affirmative action cases to show how those Justices,
who themselves joined in the Majority in Adarand, previously
endorsed and recognized the significant distinction.15 8 Further-
more, Justice Stevens contended that "[i]ronically after all of the
time, effort, and paper this Court has expended in differentiat-
ing between federal and state affirmative action, the majority
today virtually ignores the issue."5 9 Finally, in his discussion of
stare decisis, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's decision
was an "unjustified departure from settled law",160 namely Fulli-
love and Metro Broadcasting, which upheld affirmative action
programs in deference to Congress.
161
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which he agreed
that the decision in Fullilove was controlling, and as such, be-
lieved the Court should have applied the principles outlined in
it. 16 2 Additionally, he stated that the program should have been
upheld because the petitioner in Adarand failed to "identify any
of the factual premises on which Fullilove rested."163 In an opti-
mistic discussion, Justice Souter relied on Justice Powell's opin-
ion in Fullilove 64 and stated that the program at issue here
would survive the Court's opinion and strict scrutiny analysis on
remand.165
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2123.
158. Id. at 2127. Justice Stevens stated that "Ca]lthough members of today's major-
ity trumpeted the importance of that distinction in Croson, they now reject it in the
name of 'congruence.'" Id. Specifically, Justice Stevens referred to Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Croson, both of which de-
scribed and emphasized the basis for such a distinction. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2127.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2131-32 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US. 448, 495-517 (1980) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)). Justice Powell found that the statute in Fullilove would even have
survived strict scrutiny analysis. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515.
165. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (because "the statutes in question.., are sub-
stantially better tailored to the harm being remedied than the statute endorsed in Fulli-
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Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, attempted to both find
common ground among all the opinions, as well as quash fears
of its implications for affirmative action programs.166 She em-
phasized the perceived consensus among the majority and dis-
senting opinions that Congress has a legitimate interest in rem-
edying the effects of past discrimination that still persist in
America. 167 Ginsburg also agreed that the Majority's use of strict
scrutiny should not necessarily be fatal to affirmative action
programs enacted by Congress because of the level of deference
afforded to it in previous case law.
68
IH. STRcT SCRUTINY APPLIED TO FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Adarand expressly adopted the strict scrutiny standard for
all affirmative action programs using racial classifications as a
basis for decisionmaking. 16 9 These programs will withstand
strict scrutiny if it can be shown that they are "narrowly tai-
lored" to "serve a compelling governmental interest."170 The
strict scrutiny standard adopted in Adarand is facially similar
to that which was adopted in Croson. However, its application
should not be the same.17' The Court in Adarand left open the
possibility that, even under strict scrutiny, Congress may be en-
titled to greater deference than state and local governments to
adopt programs employing racial classifications. 72 As such, the
difficulty of withstanding both the compelling governmental in-
terest and narrow tailoring legs of strict scrutiny may not be en-
countered to the same degree when lower courts are called on to
apply the standard.
On remand, the Court of Appeals will need to determine the
constitutionality of the federal SCC provision of the Small Busi-
love [they would] pass muster under Fifth Amendment due process and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection.").
166. Id. at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2135. Justice Ginsburg cited several recent reports which demonstrated
a difference, based on race, of minorities' inability to obtain employment, housing, and
government contracts due to "conscious" and 'unconscious" biases that perpetuate the
barriers of exclusion. Id. at 2135 nn.3-6. For a discussion on why affirmative action pro-
grams are still a necessity, given the current social and political climate, see T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991).
168. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136. Justice Ginsburg stated that "today's decision [is]
one that allows our precedent to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to chang-
ing conditions Id. See also infra Part III.B.
169. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
170. Id.
171. See infra Part llI.B.
172. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
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ness Act. In doing so, it will apply the strict scrutiny standard
outlined by the Court in Adarand.173 This standard need not,
and should not, be applied the same way in which it has been
applied to state and local programs.
A. Strict Scrutiny at the State and Local Levels
Since the Supreme Court's 1989 Croson decision, numerous
state and local affirmative action programs and MBE utilization
measures have come under constitutional attack.174 Federal
courts applying the strict scrutiny standard outlined in Croson
have, in most cases, struck down those programs.175 Most pro-
grams under Croson do not meet either requirement of the strict
scrutiny standard.
176
The first leg of the strict scrutiny test requires governments
to enact programs based on a "compelling interest." 77 At state
and local government levels, this has included an interest in
remedying the effects of its own discriminatory practices, as well
as those to practices to which it had become a "passive partici-
pant." 78 However, the discrimination to be remedied must be
identified with particularity and supported by specific evi-
'dence. 179 Thus, general assertions of "[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, [are] too amorphous a basis for imposing a ra-
cially classified remedy."8 0 Instead there must be evidence of a
"prima facie case of a constitutional violation" of the rights of
minorities in a particular geographic area and industry. 8 '
Federal Courts applying this leg of the standard have had
difficulty in finding what they perceive to be the required evi-
dence of discrimination to support the adoption of a race-con-
scious- remedy.8 2 Thus, cases analyzing this part of the strict
173. For a breakdown of the possible outcome of Adarand, see Watson & Harrison,
supra note 114.
174. For an analysis of the implications and effect of Croson, see Janice R. Franke,
Defining the Parameters of Permissible State and Local Affirmative Action Programs, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 387 (1994); Duncan, supra note 67; see also infra note 182.
175. See Franke, supra note 174, at 402 ("In general, state and local set-aside pro-
grams have not fared well under judicial application of the Croson standards."). See also
infra note 182.
176. See infra note 182.
177. City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 485-86 (1989).
178. Id. at 492.
179. Id. at 497.
180. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
181. Id. at 500.
182. See, ag., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (finding that the District's Minority Contracting Act, which imposed a goal of
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scrutiny requirement often involve an in-depth investigation
into the programs at issue. This investigation includes examin-
ing the legislative histories of such programs to determine if the
programs were enacted based on specific evidence of discrimina-
tion. Statistics concerning local construction and hiring prac-
tices, as well as the availability of qualified MBEs in the region
permeate the decisions. 183 In most instances, courts have held
that the statistics do not justify the adoption of the race-
conscious remedial measures, 84 and then dismiss the proffered
evidence as "anecdotal" and insufficient.
185
The second leg of the strict scrutiny standard requires af-
firmative action programs to be "narrowly tailored" to remedy
the identified discrimination. 8 6 This ensures that the programs
were enacted after careful consideration and deliberation, and
that the possibility of less intrusive or race-neutral alternatives
has been exhausted. The factors taken into account typically in-
clude: (1) whether the government considered race-neutral alter-
natives before adopting the program; 87 (2) the flexibility and
scope of the program;, and whether there is a waiver mechanism
within it; 8 8 (3) the relationship of the numerical target of the
program with the relevant labor market;189 (4) the duration of
the program and whether it is subject to periodic review; 90 and
awarding 35 percent of its contracts to certified MBEs was unconstitutional); Associated
Gen. Contractors v. City of New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1992) (finding that a
renewal to a set-aside based on disadvantaged status, where minorities were presumed
to be disadvantaged, met neither prong of the Croson standard); Concrete Gen. v. Wash-
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp. 370 (D. Md. 1991) (invalidating a Mi-
nority Procurement Policy which was not supported by sufficient evidence of discrimina-
tion); Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991)
(overturning an MBE set-aside designed to include women and minorities in city con-
tracting opportunities); Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (finding that the evidentiary basis of an MBE set-aside aimed at increasing
minority participation in a school district's contracting opportunities was insufficient to
justify adoption of affirmative action plan).
183. See Duncan, supra note 67, at 698 (stating that the District Court's opinion in
O'Donnell involved discussion of" 'detailed testimony and voluminous data from govern-
mental and industrial representatives, including Committee members and staff, federal
agencies, finance and bonding industries, minority organizations, minority contractors,
and non-minority and large contracting firm representatives"). Id. (quoting O'Donnell,
762 F. Supp. at 358).
184. See supra note 182.
185. See Duncan, supra note 67, at 698. But see infra note 199.
186. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 508.
189. Id. at 506.
190. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995). See also Local
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(5) the degree and type of burden on non-minorities caused by
the program.191
Application of this leg of the strict scrutiny standard has
also resulted in invalidating affirmative action programs. Most
often, discussion of this leg of the standard is limited because
the court has already held that the program failed to satisfy the
compelling interest leg. However, some inferences can be drawn
concerning its application at the state and local level.
In some cases, courts found that the lack of a sunset provi-
sion in the program, which would have limited the duration of
the remedy, proved fatal to it. 192 Moreover, courts also found
that, when examining the legislative histories, race-neutral al-
ternatives were not considered. 193 As such, the affirmative action
programs were premature. 9 4 In addition, another problem fed-
eral courts have found in these programs is the over-inclusive-
ness of particular racial minorities. For instance, in O'Donnell
Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, 95 the court found it un-
settling that no evidence was offered concerning the discrimina-
tion of any other minority group aside from African-Americans.
Therefore, the fact that Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans,
Native Americans, and Pacific Islander Americans were included
in the MBE set-aside deemed the program insufficiently
tailored. 96
An analysis of the application of strict scrutiny at the local
level certainly would lead many to believe that strict scrutiny is
28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 487 (1986) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (race-based hiring goal was narrowly tailored in part because it was not "im-
posed as a permanent requirement, but [was] of limited duration").
191. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986) (stating that race-
based lay-off practices impose a greater burden on non-minorities than raced-based pro-
motions and hiring practices, because "denial of a future employment opportunity is not
as intrusive as loss of an existing job").
192. See, ag., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427-28
(D.C. Cir. 1992). See also Davis v. City of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding plan at issue was overall narrowly tailored, but needed to be more limited in
duration).
193. See, eg., Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, 773 F. Supp. 1018, 1031-32
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (city's failure to consider race-neutral means to accomplish its goal
proved fatal to the narrow tailoring requirement).
194. See Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-62 (E.D.
Pa. 1989). The court in Main Line Paving reasoned that race-neutral alternatives, which
could include lowering bonding requirements or abandoning bidders lists, needed to be
considered first before the Philadelphia school board implemented the MBE set-aside.
Id. at 1362.
195. 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
196. Id. at 422, 427-28.
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"strict in theory, but fatal in fact. 197 At the state and local level
this can be attributed in part to the fact that states do not have
the "positive grant of legislative power"198 conferred on Congress
through Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
states' abilities to remedy the effects of past discrimination are
not as extensive as Congress'. 199 However, the future application
of the same language of the strict scrutiny standard to Congres-
sional race-conscious relief should not be as fatal as it has been
at the municipal and state level.
197. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
198. City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989) (quoting Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 US. 641, 651 (1966)).
199. Id. at 490. It is important to note that not all programs investigated after
Croson were struck down. It is possible to withstand strict scrutiny at the state and lo-
cal level, provided that the governmental authority has found sufficient evidence of dis-
crimination and appropriately created a narrow remedy. See, eg., Peightal v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirmative action plan intended to
recruit minorities in Dade County Fire Department was justified by sufficient evidence
to demonstrate a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored because race-
neutral alternatives had been considered, it was not overinclusive, and it did not unduly
burden non-minorities); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992) (uphold-
ing city police department's affirmative action hiring policy, entered into as part of a
consent decree, because city had strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial ac-
tion was necessary); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition for Econ. Equal.,
950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991) (denying contractor's motion for preliminary injunction
based on the unlikely success on the merits of its equal protection claim against a city
ordinance giving bid preference to MBEs); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991)
(race-conscious promotions based upon a consent decree between police department and
association of African-American officers were both narrowly tailored and justified by a
compelling state interest); Davis v. City of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding that evidence was sufficient to support court-ordered race-based hiring in city
fire department, and plan was narrowly tailored); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 742 F.
Supp. 1275 (D. Md. 1990) aff'd, 977 F.2d 574 (1993) (stating that school board's faculty
assignment policy which included a seniority override goal would withstand strict scru-
tiny analysis).
In addition, courts applying the strict scrutiny standard outlined in Croson have
found that a question of fact existed precluding summary judgment in favor of a party
claiming equal protection violations. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver,
36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995) (finding that a ques-
tion of fact existed as to nature and extent of evidence justifying adoption of city's mi-
nority contractor preference ordinance, precluding summary judgment); Contractors
Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that summary judg-
ment in favor of contractors was improper given the City's demonstration that sufficient
statistical evidence was presented to justify compelling state interest and question of
fact existed as to whether plan was narrowly tailored); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough
County, 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990) (material fact existed as to whether county's MBE
utilization law violated equal protection). In Cone, the Court stated that "It]he statistics
gleaned from... studies provide a prima facie case of discrimination sufficient to clear
the summary judgment hurdle." Id. at 915.
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B. Strict Scrutiny at the Federal Level
Strict scrutiny under Adarand may prove to be a "kindler-
gentler"200 examination of affirmative action programs. The
Court in Adarand stopped clear of declaring an outright consti-
tutional ban on affirmative action programs.20 1 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion stated that "[w]hen race-based ac-
tion is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest,
such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
narrow tailoring test this court has set out in previous cases."
2 2
Thus, while some commentators have criticized the Court's hold-
ing as an improper departure from precedent,2 3 and thus an
end affirmative action, 204 such a fearful reaction to the Court's
holding overlooks the possibility of upholding federal programs
using the Adarand Majority's own language as well as the pre-
cedent upon which it relied to arrive at its conclusion.
205
1. Identifying a Federal Compelling Interest. In Adarand,
the Majority stated that the government was not "disqualified
from acting in response to" racial discrimination.206 In fact, Con-
gress has a clear constitutional mandate in Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the equal protection rights
that Amendment guarantees. 207 Because of this mandate, courts,
including the Supreme Court, have long recognized a certain
level of deference that should be afforded Congress when enforc-
ing equal protection guarantees.
The Supreme Court, in Fullilove,2°8 Croson,20 9 and Metro
200. Charles J. Falletta, Recent Case, 6 S.ToN HALL CONST. L.J. 295, 330 (1995).
201. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995). It is also im-
portant to note that the majority opinion did not include the views expressed by either
Justices Scalia or Thomas. These concurring opinions would have virtually banned all
future use of governmental racial classifications. See supra Part II.C. Thus, a majority of
the Court clearly does not advocate for the elimination of affirmative action programs.
202. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
203. See Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 156.
204. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
205. In addition, while strict scrutiny is an extremely high hurdle to overcome, it
does not always mean an end to the program being examined. See supra note 199.
206. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
207. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article" U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Supreme Court has read the
Fourteenth Amendment to bestow upon Congress certain powers, while at the same time
limiting the powers of the states. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 US. 641 (1966), the Su-
preme Court stated that Congress had the authority, under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to enact remedial legislation even if a constitutional violation had
not been found of Section 1. Id. at 648.
208. In Fullilove, the court stated that "[it is fundamental that in no organ of gov-
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Broadcasting,210 recognized the unique power of Congress in this
regard. In fact, in each of these cases, the Court engaged in a
discussion concerning the differences between state and local
governments' and Congress' power to adopt appropriate legisla-
tion to address racial discrimination.211 Taken together these
cases, and the various Justices opinions, recognize that "a sound
distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on
race rests not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amend-
ments, but upon social reality and governmental theory."212
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated that the
Court's previous holdings and opinions concerning the positive
grant of Congressional power to combat the problem of racial
discrimination was not implicated in the Adarand decision.213
ernment, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than
in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to
enforce equal protection guarantees:' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US. 448, 483 (1980). In
addition, Justices Powell and Burger, in their opinions in Fullilove, explained that defer-
ence was due to Congress in light of their powers under the Commerce Clause, the
Spending Clause, and the Civil War Amendments. See id. at 473-78. Moreover, in Fulli-
love, Justice Powell's concurrence, applying the strict scrutiny standard he delineated in
Bakke, found that "[tihe Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the
disabling effects of identified discrimination." Id. at 497. He also stated the .[the history
of this Court's review of congressional action demonstrates beyond question that the Na-
tional Legislature is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations. Unlike the
Regents of the University of California, Congress properly may - and indeed must - ad-
dress directly the problems of discrimination in our society." Id. at 499.
209. Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion in Croson, stated that Congress may
have more latitude than state and local governments to find a compelling governmental
interest. City of Richmond v. J-4- Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989). In addition, she
stated that "Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitu-
tional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil War
Amendments themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between congres-
sional and state power over matters of race." Id. at 490. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court identified the 'institutional competence" of
Congress in fostering racial diversity in broadcasting. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990). In addition, the Court reaffirmed its propositions in Fullilove
by restating that:
[Wihen a program employing a benign racial classification is adopted ... at
the explicit direction of Congress, we are "bound to approach our task with ap-
propriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Consti-
tution with the power to 'provide for the . .. general Welfare of the United
States' and 'to enforce by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment?'
Id. at 563 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
211. See supra notes 50, 72-73, 78, 82 and accompanying text.
212. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
213. The Majority stated that:
[i]t is true that various members of this Court have taken different views of
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Additionally, Justice O'Connor dispelled the suggestion, averred
by Justice Stevens in his dissent, that the members of the Ma-
jority in Adarand were altering their previous views on this
Congressional authority.
214
Therefore, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the powers it bestows upon Congress to "enforce [I by appropri-
ate legislation"215 the mandates of equal protection have not
been disturbed by Adarand.216 An analysis of this power shows
that, up until and including Adarand, the deference afforded
Congress allows it to enact race-conscious remedial measures
without the same limits placed on local and state govern-
ments. 217 Congress' power to combat racial discrimination would
be emasculated if it were required to proffer an equivalent
amount of evidence as states when utilizing racial classifications
as a basis for decisionmaking. Therefore, when applying the
compelling interest leg to federal affirmative action programs,
courts should grant deference to Congress' findings concerning
its need to remedy the effects of prior and present discrimina-
tory practices.
2. The Narrow Tailoring at the Federal Level. The nar-
rowly tailored leg of strict scrutiny, unlike the compelling inter-
est leg, will most likely be applied in the same manner at the
federal level as it is at the state and local levels.218 For instance,
the Majority in Adarand gave guidance to the lower court on re-
mand concerning this part of strict scrutiny. It stated that the
lower court, when examining the SCC provision of the Small
Business Act, should determine whether there was "any consid-
eration of race-neutral means to increase minority business par-
the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal
with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts
should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority. We need not, and do not,
address these differences today.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
214. Id. In response to Justice Stevens' dissent in Adarand, where he questioned
the Court's application of stare decisis with respect to the Congressional authority to
combat racial discrimination, Justice O'Connor stated that "it is enough to observe that
Justice Stevens' suggestion that any member of this Court has repudiated in this case
his or her previously expressed views on the subject .... is incorrect." Id.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5.
216. See supra notes 206-14; see also 115 S. Ct. at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[Tioday's decision should leave § 5 exactly where it is as the source of an interest of
the national government sufficiently important to satisfy the corresponding requirement
of the strict scrutiny test").
217. See supra notes 208-10.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 186-96.
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ticipation in government contracting. 219 In addition, Justice
O'Connor stated that the court should ensure that the program
"was appropriately limited such that it '1 not last longer than
the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate'.
'220 It
seems clear that, like the courts applying Croson, these two fac-
tors are significant in determining the validity of affirmative ac-
tion measures even at the federal level.
In addition, determining whether a certain program is nar-
rowly tailored does not seem to implicate the same broad powers
of the Fourteenth Amendment or the necessary deference
granted to Congress. The narrow tailoring requirement ensures
that the means chosen by the government fit the ends it wishes
to accomplish.221 Deference owed to Congress implicates its abil-
ity to identify and redress past discrimination.222 It does not,
however, mean that Congress can choose any means necessary
to fulfill this obligation.223 Therefore, application of this compo-
nent certainly will involve very similar analyses to either local,
state or federal programs.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Adarand does not mean the end of federal af-
firmative action. Lower courts applying strict scrutiny to federal
affirmative action programs must give deference to Congres-
sional power to redress discrimination and its continued effects
on minorities. Thus, on remand, the Court of Appeals is not pre-
cluded from finding that the SBA's Subcontractors Compensa-
tion Clause is a constitutional extension of Congress' powers. In
fact, absent any problems of narrow tailoring, the Court of Ap-
peals should uphold the program at issue.
Even if strict scrutiny is applied by federal courts to rid
many affirmative action programs of racial classifications, this
also may not mean the end of preferences aimed at improving
minority participation in American industries, education, em-
ployment, or contracting. The racial classifications used in the
programs could be substituted or narrowed to only include eco-
nomic disadvantage as a basis for decisionmaking. Justice
O'Connor stated in Adarand that programs based on disadvan-
219. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (internal quotations omitted).
220. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980)).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 191-201.
222. See supra Part III.B.1.
223. In fact, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that Congress can
enforce the provisions of the amendment only "by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
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tage, rather than race, are "subject only to the most relaxed ju-
dicial scrutiny."224 Thus, so long as affirmative action programs
are based on economics instead of race, they will be upheld.
225
While the reach of affirmative action measures designed to as-
sist the "economic disadvantaged" may not be as extensive as
those using race, the impact on racial minorities will be appar-
ent. So long as minorities continue to be discriminated against,
and kept out of the economic circles of federal contracting and
employment, they will be able to receive the benefits of affirma-
live action measures based on economic disadvantage status.226
While the wake of Adarand may not resemble the wake of
Croson, there remain several unanswered questions by the Ma-
jority's opinion. First, what is the fate of intermediate scrutiny?
Gender classifications are still primarily held to that standard.
As such, what effect, if any, will Adarand, and its doctrinal
analysis concerning lines drawn on immutable characteristics,
have on gender classifications that use a person's sex as a basis
for decisionmaking?
227
There is also the possibility that Adarand will be overruled
as an aberration. This depends on the makeup of the Court in
the future. The decisions in Adarand, Metro Broadcasting,
Croson, and Fullilove were all 5-4 decisions. Thus, the political
realities involved in presidential nominations, and how they
have affected equal protection jurisprudence, cannot be ignored.
One thing does seem obvious, however. "[T]here will be
some interpretive forks in the road before the significance of
strict scrutiny for congressional remedial statutes becomes en-
224. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105. "The Government urges that the Subcontracting
Compensation Clause program is a program based on disadvantage, not on race, and
thus that it is subject only to the most relaxed judicial scrutiny. To the extent that the
statutes and regulations involved in this case are race neutral, we agree." (internal quo-
tations omitted). Id,
225. Provided, however, that they otherwise meet the requirements of "the most re-
laxed judicial scrutiny." Id. This could also mean that even if the SBA's 8(a) program
here was found to be unconstitutional in the lower court because of its use of race as a
presumption to disadvantage, that does not mean the program will be erased from the
United States Code. Instead, it would have to use economic disadvantage, not race, as
its determining factor.
226. However, the problems associated with racial discrimination, as pointed out by
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, have nothing to do with economic status. Thus, if af-
firmative action is stripped of its ability to address racial discrimination, economically
sound minorities will not be compensated or remedied for their continued marginaliza-
tion. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2134-36. See also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
227. For a discussion of how Adarand will effect equal protection jurisprudence with







228. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).

